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ABSTRACT

Distributed denial of service attacks threaten the security and health of the Internet.
These attacks continue to grow in scale and potency. Remediation relies on up-to-date and
accurate attack signatures. Signature-based detection is relatively inexpensive computationally. Yet, signatures are inflexible when small variations exist in the attack vector. Attackers
exploit this rigidity by altering their attacks to bypass the signatures. The constant need
to stay one step ahead of attackers using signatures demonstrates a clear need for better
methods of detecting DDoS attacks.

In this research, we examine the application of machine learning models to real network
data for the purpose of classifying attacks. During training, the models build a representation
of their input data. This eliminates any reliance on attack signatures and allows for accurate
classification of attacks even when they are slightly modified to evade detection. In the course
of our research, we found a significant problem when applying conventional machine learning
models. Network traffic, whether benign or malicious, is temporal in nature. This results
in differences in its characteristics between any significant time span. These differences
cause conventional models to fail at classifying the traffic. We then turned to deep learning
models. We obtained a significant improvement in performance, regardless of time span. In
this research, we also introduce a new method of transforming traffic data into spectrogram
images. This technique provides a way to better distinguish different types of traffic. Finally,
we introduce a framework for embedding attack detection in real-world applications.
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PART 1

INTRODUCTION

The Internet is an indispensable part of our social, economic, and political well-being.
Indeed, as Tim Berners-Lee, the father of the World Wide Web, put it, “There was a time
when people felt the Internet was another world, but now people realise it’s a tool that we
use in this world.”. Along with this success has come a threat in the form of denial of service
(DoS) attacks, where a malicious user attacks some resource to deny the service or services it
provides to other users. Denial of service attacks are generally either a “centralized” attack
where the malicious user attacks a target (or targets) from a single source, or a so-called
“distributed” denial of service (DDoS) attack, where the attacker can use many hundreds or
thousands of compromised computer systems to launch an attack. The focus of this research
is on attacks of the latter type. The magnitude of these attacks can range from benign
pranks to very costly down time. Though commercial and non-commercial solutions exist to
mitigate these attacks, they typically rely on attack signatures to mitigate known attacks.
Similar to computer malware and viruses, DDoS attacks tend to change over time in order
to defeat these signatures. This means that any system for mitigating them must be able to
cope with these changes in order to detect anomalous traffic behavior.

1.1

An Overview of Denial of Service Attacks
Fundamentally, a denial of service attack can be thought of as any attack on a resource

that is meant to deny other, legitimate use of that resource. Denial of service attacks
generally take one of two forms: a “centralized” attack where the malicious user attacks a
target (or targets) from a single source, or a so-called “distributed” denial of service (DDoS)
attack, where the attacker can use many hundreds or thousands of compromised computer
systems to launch an attack. In both methods, the attacker conceals his identity and location
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in order to maximize the lifetime of the attack. The following sections provide an overview
of each method.
1.1.1 Traditional Denial of Service Attacks
Traditional denial of service attacks can be thought of as an attack meant to disrupt
or crash a service. There are two general forms of DoS attacks: those that crash services
and those that flood services[2]. A buffer overflow attack is an attack in which the attacker
exploits code which does not properly sanitize the input given to it. The result is that the
bounds of a finite memory buffer are exceeded, allowing the attacker to crash the service
or simply take control of it. Examples of flooding services are a SYN1 attack, where the
attacker floods a target with TCP SYN packets in order to exhaust the target’s memory, the
ICMP2 “ping of death” attack, in which the attacker sends an extremely large payload in an
ICMP packet to crash operating systems that are unable to handle them, a Teardrop attack,
where the attacker sends fragmented packets whose fragment offsets overlap 3 , to a simple
ping flood, where the attacker tries to consume the target’s bandwidth with large amounts
of ICMP packets. With the exception of the ping flood attack, all modern operating systems
have been patched against these sorts of attacks. The ping flood attack, when carried out by
a large number of attackers, can be particularly effective. In this scenario, it is considered
to be a distributed denial of service attack, and is discussed in the next section.
1.1.2 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
When several attacking systems are coordinated and directed at a target, the attack is
known as a distributed denial of service attack. A DoS attack is shown in Figure 1.1 and a
DDoS attack is shown in Figure 1.2 for comparison.
1

The SYN, or synchronize packet, is the first packet in the TCP “three-way handshake” and is used to
establish a connection to a remote system.
2
ICMP is used for a variety of functions, including checking whether a system is reachable.
3
Packet fragmentation is used when a packet is too large to be transmitted on one or more segments along
the path from its source to its destination. Fragment offsets allow the receiver to reassemble the received
fragments correctly.

3

Figure 1.1. A DoS attack.

The DoS attack in Figure 1.1 is meant to be an abstraction - these types of attacks do
not necessarily require the attacker to send malicious packets to the target. In the case of a
buffer overflow attack, the attacker could even be a valid user on the target system!
The DDoS attack shown in Figure 1.2 is by definition reliant on the attackers sending
malicious packets to the target, however, the packets are not known a priori to be malicious.

Figure 1.2. A DDoS attack.

The coordination of attacking systems for these kinds of attacks can be managed by
a single attacker employing one of two known methods [3]. The first is the Agent-Handler
model where the attacking systems are compromised computers with agent software installed
to carry out the attack. The attacker controls and monitors the attacking systems via the
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handlers, which each control a subset of the attacking systems. The second is a so-called
“botnet”, which is a collection of compromised computers controlled by the attacker and
directed to attack a target [4]. Each of the attacking systems connects to a private IRC
channel created for the specific purpose of coordinating an attack. In both architectures,
the attacker issues commands to either a handler or directly to an agent on a compromised
system to launch an attack.
Amplification Attacks DDoS amplification attacks exploit the characteristics of certain packet types and protocols in order to provide volumetric increases in malicious attack
traffic in response to small amounts of legitimate query traffic. An example of an amplification attack is shown in Figure 1.3.

Figure 1.3. A DDoS amplification attack.

In the figure, the attacking systems send a small payload consisting of a query of some
type to a set of systems running a service whose response traffic is known to be larger than
the query traffic. The query packets have forged IP destination address headers, which are
set to the target’s IP address. Depending upon the service running on the amplification
hosts, an amplification factor of several hundreds of times the size of the query traffic can be
achieved. In the case of DNS reflection, the amplification factor is 8x, meaning the attack
generates eight times more response traffic, which is then sent to the target, than query
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traffic. However, in the case of NTP and SNMP reflection, amplification can be over 200x
and 650x, respectively [5].
Perhaps the most well known amplification attack is the NTP reflection attack carried
out in 2014 against CloudFlare, a company that provides CDN services for popular websites.
As detailed in [5], the attackers exploited a flaw in NTP whereby an attacking system queries
an exposed NTP server for a list of systems that have recently queried the NTP server (called
a “MONLIST”) [6]. Because the size of the MONLIST is larger than the original query, the
response traffic has thus been “amplified”. The attack against CloudFlare was measured at
over 400 Gigabits per second (Gbps) with an amplification factor of 200x [5].
1.1.3 Impacts of Denial of Service Attacks
The impacts caused by a denial of service attack vary. For traditional DoS attacks,
the impact is usually a brief disruption for a single service. For DDoS attacks, the impact
is much greater. Because these attacks typically target large networks which host services
or users in a shared environment, when a single end host is targeted, it often takes down
services for other users sharing the environment. In extreme cases such as the CloudFlare
attack mentioned previously, entire networks can become unreachable for the duration of the
attack.

1.2

Research Outline
Throughout this document, a chronology of tools and information that details this

research will be presented. This project was born out of my many years of experience as
a professional network engineer and architect. I had several occasions where I had to help
remediate DDoS attacks and the lessons learned were invaluable. However, I lacked a deep
understanding of what is really needed for useful attack detection. This research intends to
fill that knowledge gap for myself and anyone that may be interested in DDoS attacks.
The most salient goal of this research is to develop a machine learning tool (or set
of tools) that can analyze network traffic in order to detect and even predict these sorts of
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attacks with a reasonable level of accuracy. The first goal is to develop a strong understanding
of DDoS attacks. The next goal is to develop a model of normal versus anomalous traffic
behavior. Various machine learning models will be evaluated against real traffic data sets.
This allows us to determine if machine learning is appropriate and which model or models
work best. Finally, we apply what we’ve learned to create a framework that can be applied
in real-world settings to detect malicious behavior.

1.3

Existing Approaches to Detection
Broadly, existing approaches to the detection of DDoS attacks can be placed in one

of two categories: network-based detection and application-level detection.

These can

be further classified into centralized detection schemes and distributed detection schemes.
Application-level detection of DDoS attacks is not of interest for this research and is not
discussed further.
Chen et al. propose in [7] the Distributed Change Point (DCP) detection architecture,
which uses a system of distributed collection points to monitor traffic traversing several
networks. Once the traffic level exceeds a predefined router threshold, β, the traffic is
considered suspicious. This is performed using a metric called deviation from average (DFA),
a ratio of historical traffic averages and the current traffic level. DFA is defined formally as
the following:

DF Ain (tm , i) =

Sin (tm , i)
X(tm , i)

(1.1)

In Equation 1.1, the values tm and i refer to the number of packets received by a router
at discrete time interval m on physical port i. The function X(tm , i) is then the historical
average number of packets received at discrete time interval m on physical port i. The
function Sin (tm , i) is the deviation from the average defined in X(tm , i).
This architecture performs well but is limited to the detection of so-called flooding
attacks. Additionally, it requires cooperation between several network operators residing in
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different autonomous systems4 for attack remediation. Speaking from practical experience,
network operators are frequently reluctant to add any additional software or hardware to
their networks based on security and operational concerns.
Similar statistical approaches exist, such as the D-WARD system proposed by Mirković
et al. in [8], which rate limits traffic considered to be non-compliant with a set of predefined
models for normal traffic. In contrast to DCP, D-WARD is placed only at the source of
traffic, and not egress points between networks. Several unanswered questions exist, namely
how to deal with the possibility of attacks within a network, updating the models of normal
traffic, and how to effectively deal with high speed routers (that is, terabit-capable routers).
Other purely statistical approaches, such as [9], rely on increasing or decreasing a rate
limit based on end system feedback, or modeling the TCP SYN arrival rate to detect attacks
[10].
In [11], Niyaz et al. use deep learning techniques as well as a software-defined networking
(SDN) approach for DDoS detection. For deep learning, a stacked autoencoder is used,
which, when trained, feeds data into a softmax5 classifier. For their SDN approach, a Traffic
Collector and Flow Installer (TCFI), Feature Extractor, and Traffic Classifier module are
used to automatically program remediation flows in the SDN controller. These modules rely
on the stacked autoencoder for detection. This approach achieves a 95.65% accuracy with a
false-positive rate of 5%. However, the authors chose to capture raw packet data as it arrives
instead of relying on a network flow collection protocol. Due to this, the application of this
approach will be limited to smaller networks.
Finally, in [12], Fiore et al. combine a discriminative RBM (DRBM) with feature-rich
training data. The discriminative RBM shows promise, however, it does suffer from long
training times and an inability to cope with data that is widely different than the network
data that training was performed on. This suggests that the DRBM may be overfitting the
4

An autonomous system (AS) is a 32-bit integer value assigned to network operators by the IANA and
delineates all of the devices under the control of a single network operator, such as Google, Level3, and so
on.
5
Softmax is the term for generalized multi-class classification using the sigmoid function discussed in
section 2.1.2.
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data. The authors acknowledge these issues and propose future research to determine a way
to generalize anomaly detection using a DRBM.
This small sample of existing literature is by no means comprehensive. It is merely meant
to provide a taste for the breadth of existing DDoS attack detection research. Additional
references to relevant literature will be made throughout the remainder of this dissertation
as appropriate.
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PART 2

ATTACK DETECTION USING CONVENTIONAL MACHINE LEARNING
MODELS

The detection of DDoS attacks fits well within the umbrella of big data. Big data
problems are characterized by five Vs: Volume, Velocity, Variety, Veracity, and Value [13].
Reliable estimation of the threat from a network attack requires rapid (Velocity) and accurate (Veracity, Value) estimation of a non-homogeneous threat (Variety) in the presence of
terabytes of data (Volume). Forecasts on both the Volume and Velocity of network traffic
show a doubling in the next three years [14].
In this chapter, we examine the use of conventional machine learning models for classifying attacks on network flow data. The data contain a combination of benign traffic and
several types of malicious traffic. We applied the Decision Tree, Random Forest, and knearest neighbors algorithms to the full data set. We then broke the data set into several
non-overlapping sets based on the time of collection to determine how the models would
perform with a time difference. The accuracy significantly deteriorates when attacks are
present in the test data but not the training data which demonstrates that the system is nonstationary. Finally, we applied feature reduction techniques to determine the most relevant
features in the data. We then retested the models to observe the impact of a reduced feature
space. Since conventional machine learning algorithms converge poorly on non-stationary
data, we conclude that generalizing on network flow data requires more advanced machine
learning algorithms.
The next section provides a brief overview of machine learning. Readers with a background in machine learning can skip to Section 2.2 if desired.
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Size
Color Texture
Medium
Red
Firm
Medium Orange
Soft
Small
Purple
Soft
Large
Yellow
Firm

Shape
Name
Round Red Apple
Round
Orange
Round
Grape
Crescent
Banana

Table 2.1. A sample labeled data set.

2.1

An Overview of Machine Learning
Machine Learning can be roughly defined as a set of methods and techniques that can

be used to help make sense of a set of data. Under this definition, machine learning is
almost indistinguishable from the related field of data mining. Indeed, many data mining
tool kits and software make heavy use of machine learning models1 . A better definition
of machine learning as it relates the the field of artificial intelligence was coined in 1959
by machine learning pioneer Arthur Samuel: “Machine learning gives computers the ability
to learn without being explicitly programmed.”. This definition is, of course, not entirely
accurate since a computer can’t learn to drive a car by simply reading a book. Instead, a
learning algorithm is used with a set of data to make decisions, infer certain values, or group
the data in some meaningful way.
The most common way to make decisions using machine learning is with classification,
which is discussed in the next section. When the requirement is to infer future values based
on previous observations, regression is most commonly used. Together, classification and
regression are referred to as supervised learning, since the particular learning algorithm must
first be trained with a set of data containing labels for the correct output. During training,
the model builds an internal representation of the training data. Once the algorithm has been
trained (using a training data set), data with the same features (called a test or validation
data set) and no labels can be given to the algorithm and it will label the data.
If no labels exist in the data, unsupervised learning is used to gain some insight about
1

A great example of this is the Apache Spark cluster computing framework. See the following link for
more information: https://spark.apache.org/.
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the data (possibly for the purpose of adding labels!). The most common approach to unsupervised learning is clustering, which is discussed in Section 2.1.3.
2.1.1 Classification
The goal of classification algorithms is to place an unknown piece of data into a known
category or class [15]. Table 2.1 shows an example data set. The columns provide the
features (sometimes referred to as attributes) for each row of data. Each feature describes
an aspect of the data that is considered the most relevant to the classification task at hand.
In the table, the features are Size, Color, Texture, and Shape. The last column provides the
label for each row, which is the category or class the particular row belongs to. Each row is
referred to as an instance. The labels are Apple, Orange, Grape, and Banana. This table
illustrates a data set used to train a learning algorithm. A sample (or test) data set would be
the same, but the Name column would not be present. Table 2.1 is an example of multiclass
classification. A simpler classification method, binary classification, is used to determine
membership in one of two classes. For DDoS detection, it would suffice to label the traffic
as either benign or not benign. Doing so provides the advantages of simpler models as well
as the ability to detect new attacks before they are recognized by signature-based systems
(so-called “zero-day” attacks).

Figure 2.1. A linearly separable set of points.
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For many machine learning models, the input data is mapped to some arbitrary ndimensional space. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate several properties of data mapped to a set
of points in Euclidean space. The set of points in Figure 2.1 can be easily separated by the
bold line, called the separating hyperplane, into two distinct classes (circles and squares in this
example). The points with dashed borders are are the closest to the separating hyperplane.
For models like the Support Vector Machine (SVM), these points are considered the support
vectors. The support vectors provide a “boundary” with which to classify instances from
a data set. An important concept with regards to support vectors is margin. The margin
is the distance from the closest point to the separating hyperplane. In Figure 2.1, the two
points at the bottom of the figure are the closest points to the separating hyperplane.

Figure 2.2. A set of points that is not linearly separable.

The points in Figure 2.2 are not linearly separable (at least not to a human observer).
However, most classification models have methods to cope with this. The SVM can make
use of a kernel for points that are not linearly separable. The kernel maps the points from
their two-dimensional Euclidean space to some other higher dimensional space so that the
SVM can classify the points [15]. The most common kernel used is the Gaussian radial basis
function, defined as [16]:
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 →

||−
x ||2
→
−
k( x ) = exp −
2σ 2

(2.1)

In the equation, the σ variable influences the number of support vectors chosen for the
data set. A smaller σ requires more support vectors and a larger σ requires fewer. The net
effect of this is to change the resulting separating hyperplane.
Other examples of classification algorithms include k-nearest neighbors, decision trees,
naive Bayes, and gradient descent, to name a few. Of those, the decision tree is of most
interest to this research. A brief description of the decision tree follows.
Decision Trees The decision tree is a powerful, yet simple classifer that can be used
with numerical data as well as nominal data (such as the data in Table 2.1). Decision trees
work by creating rules for splitting nodes based on the features in the data. These rules
are analogous to asking a series of yes/no questions on the data. The predicted class of the
input data is that of the leaf node once reached.
Several algorithms exist for constructing a decision tree (e.g. ID3, C4.5, CART, etc...).
In this research we use the CART algorithm [17]. CART runs in logarithmic time and uses
Gini impurity on features to split nodes. Gini impurity is the probability of obtaining two
different output predictions for a given input. The Gini impurity of node t for j = {1, · · · , k}
possible classes is given by Equation 2.2:

1−

k
X

p2 (j|t)

(2.2)

j=1

The tree generated by the decision tree algorithm is easy to understand. This simplicity makes decision trees very popular for many machine learning tasks. Effective attack
classification requires that the machine learning model generalize on the data.
It is possible to combine decision trees in order to improve accuracy and robustness.
Such a combination is called a Random Forest, and is part of a machine learning technique
called model ensembling. In an ensemble, the individual decision trees are called estimators.
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Two model ensemble techniques exist. The first combines and then averages the results of
the individual estimators. This method is called bagging, and in the case of decision trees, it
is called a Random Forest. The other method, boosting, places the estimators sequentially
with the goal of improving the performance of the combined estimator. In this chapter, we
make use of the Random Forest (bagging) to compare performance with single estimators.
2.1.2 Regression
Regression is used when unknown values need to be inferred from a data set. The
predicted values can be continuous, as in the case of linear regression. Other regression
techniques exist, including ordinary least squares, weighted, and non-linear regression, to
name a few. Logistic regression, which forms the basis of artificial neural networks (discussed
in section 3.1.1), is the most applicable to this research and is discussed in the next section.
Logistic Regression Like all regression methods, logistic regression finds the best-fit
coefficients for some function. In the case of logistic regression, this function is nonlinear
and is called the sigmoid (or logistic) function. The sigmoid function (so-named because of
its s-shaped graph) is expressed as the following:

f (x) =

1
1 + e−x

(2.3)

The output of this function is a real number between 0 and 1 that acts as a probability
estimate for the input. Logistic regression imposes a threshold whereby output over 0.5 is
classified as 1 and output below 0.5 is classified as 0. This enables logistic regression to take
both real-valued and discrete input values and perform binary classification on them.
−
The input to the sigmoid function is a vector →
x = w0 x0 + w1 x1 + ... + wn xn . Each
−
w i xi ∈ →
x is a weight attached to a feature and the weights are determined by some optimization function. The optimization function is chosen based on the objective (minimization
or maximization). Several optimization functions exist, however, the gradient descent algorithm is the most commonly used in machine learning.

15
−
Based on the input vector →
x , gradient descent finds the set of weights that minimizes
the error (or cost) between the features and their correct classification2 given a set of training
data. Once the error has been minimized, logistic regression is then able to classify data
from a sample data set. The gradient descent algorithm can be expressed in pseudocode as
shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Gradient Descent
Set all the weights in the weights vector to 1
while i < maxiterations do
Calculate the gradient of the entire data set
Update the weights vector with the current weights added to product of the step size
and the new gradient
end while
Return the weights vector

It is useful to imagine gradient descent performing a search for the function minimum
on a two-dimensional surface. For each iteration, a step size parameter (typically denoted
α) controls how quickly the gradient moves along the surface and the computed gradient
determines the direction that is taken along the surface. The value chosen for α is important;
if α is too small the algorithm could produce a value that is nowhere near the minimum since
the loop will be exited too early and if α is too large, it may pass right over the minimum.
The maxiterations value prevents the algorithm from oscillating indefinitely in the event it
gets stuck in a local minima.
Gradient descent suffers from performance problems when training on large data sets
containing a large number of features. Because it must compute the gradient for all the
points in the data set before updating the set of weights, the convergence time can be quite
large. An alternative algorithm, stochastic gradient descent, changes this by calculating the
gradient and updating the weights on a single instance at a time. Training using stochastic
gradient descent can be done in a fraction of the time compared to gradient descent. This
2

Linear regression, which finds a best-fit line for a set of points, uses the squared error function
(mxi + b))2 for computing the error between the best fit line and the given set of points.

PM

i=1 (yi −
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technique of training as new instances arrive is called online learning since the set of weights
is adjusted incrementally instead of the all at once approach of gradient descent. That is,
the values of the weights are retained even as new training data arrive instead of simply
throwing them away and starting over.
Though we do not make use of the gradient descent algorithm in this chapter, it is
heavily used by artificial neural networks (ANN). We will explore several neural network
models in Chapter 3.
All of the machine learning techniques discussed so far share one common shortcoming:
they can only classify data given a set of known labels. Sometimes we would like to take a
set of unlabeled data (network flows) and give some meaning to it. Unsupervised learning
accomplishes this and can even classify unlabeled data using clustering, which is discussed
in the next section.
2.1.3 Clustering
Clustering is a type of unsupervised learning that automatically forms clusters (classes)
of similar things [15]. Many clustering algorithms exist, but the k-means algorithm is the
most relevant to this research and is discussed briefly in the next section.
k-means Clustering The k-means algorithm finds k clusters from a given data set,
where the value of k is provided as input. Each cluster is centered around a so-called centroid,
which is a point that lies at the center of the cluster. Pseudocode for k-means [15] is shown
in Algorithm 2.
Importantly, the distance metric used to calculate the distances between the points and
the centroids is arbitrary, so any metric space can be used. This also implies the use of
numeric values for distances; the development of a distance metric ∈ R which maps mostly
nominal network flow data values to a metric space is expected to be a crucial part of this
research work.
The k-means algorithm differs from the previously discussed learning algorithms since
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Algorithm 2: k-means clustering
Create k points for initial centroid point assignments
while any point has changed cluster assignment do
for all points in the data set do
for every centroid do
Calculate the distance between the centroid and point
Assign the point to the cluster with the lowest distance
end for
end for
for every cluster do
Calculate the mean of the points in that cluster
Assign the centroid to the mean
end for
end while

finding an optimal solution for k clusters3 in d dimensions is NP-hard [19]. Several heuristic
algorithms exist, such as Lloyd’s [20] algorithm. Additionally, dimensionality reduction
techniques such as principal component analysis can speed up the convergence time of kmeans [21] by retaining only the most important features in the data set.

2.2

Methodology
We explored the use of conventional machine learning approaches on experimental net-

work flow data in order to determine baseline performance as the first step to developing
better approaches. In particular, we analyzed the Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data set
published by Sharafaldin et al in [22]. This data set consists of 15 different attacks over a
week of collection. The data set also includes benign background traffic which mimics typical
user behavior. The Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data set is hereafter referred to as the
CIC-IDS data set.
We also examined the KDD ’99 network intrusion data set [23]. This data set is often
used for machine learning applications. The KDD and CIC-IDS data set differ in several
important ways:
3

Determining the correct value for k is NP-hard; when k and d are fixed, k-means converges in polynomial
time [18].
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• The KDD data consists of connections between endpoints and not whole flows
• Much of the KDD data has connections with a duration of zero
• The KDD data has no source or destination Internet Protocol (IP) addresses
• The KDD data has no source ports
• The KDD data has destination ports, but they are the nominal service names instead
of numeric values
The most glaring difference between the data sets is that the KDD data set is much older.
There is a well known truism that “Attacks always get better; they never get worse.” [24]
Modern attacks and attack methods have evolved since the publishing of the KDD data set.
It is possible that the KDD data set may no longer represent common attacks. We included
this data set to show how well machine learning methods work for attack classification in
disparate data sets.

2.3

Experiment
Once we cleaned the two data sets, we applied the Decision Tree, Random Forest, and

kNN classifiers to the full data sets. We found excellent cross-validated accuracy when we
looked at the entire data set. When the data set was segmented by time to study the effect
of novel attacks the results were less impressive. We also looked at the effects of removing
various features from the data to determine the minimal set of features needed to achieve
high accuracy.
2.3.1 Accuracy of Machine Learning
Table 2.2 shows the performance of the decision tree for both data sets. We removed
the IP addresses from the CIC-IDS data for two important reasons. First, attackers spoof
IP addresses to hide themselves and defeat IP filtering systems. Second, the high variance of
the IP addresses “crowded out” the other attributes when applying feature reduction. This
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Split (train % / test %)
67/33
50/50
33/66

Accuracy/Std Dev
97.881/0.010
97.837/0.033
97.759/0.026

Split (train % / test %)
67/33
50/50
33/66

Accuracy/Std Dev
99.982/0.0004
99.981/0.001
99.973/0.008

CIC-IDS
Precision
97.881
97.837
97.759
KDD
Precision
99.982
99.981
99.973

Recall
97.881
97.837
97.759

F1 Score
97.881
97.837
97.759

Recall
99.982
99.981
99.973

F1 Score
99.982
99.981
99.973

Table 2.2. Cross-validated performance on the entire CIC-IDS and KDD data sets. The IP
addresses are excluded from the CIC-IDS data set. All scores are percentages.

complicates efforts to find a set of features that best characterize attacks. We applied k-fold
cross-validation with k = 3 in all cases. The accuracy scores shown are averages taken over
the folds. Table 2.3 shows the running time of the decision tree. The running times shown
are averages taken over the folds.
Though the results in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 are appealing, they obscure a problem
we found with the data. Because the amount and type of traffic varies by day (for the CICIDS data) and by connection (for the KDD data) the data are not stationary. This lack of
stationarity means that generalizing on the data is difficult. Traditional machine learning
algorithms such as decision trees, support vector machines, and so on will not work without
modifications because they expect the underlying data to have a stationary distribution.
To test this, we first trained a decision tree on the CIC-IDS Monday data set. We
then checked its accuracy on the rest of the week. We obtained scores of 96.897, 63.524,
99.517, and 71.172 for Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, respectively. We tested
retrospective learning by training on Friday’s data. We then checked accuracy on Thursday,
Wednesday, Tuesday, and Monday and obtained scores of 95.264, 64.117, 96.811, 99.714,
respectively. We obtained similar results when we tested using a random forest with 10
estimators.
We further tested decision tree and random forest generalization on a power set of the
days of the CIC-IDS data. The decision tree result is shown in Table 2.4. The random forest
result is shown in Table 2.5. The average score is 84.407% and the standard deviation is
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Split (train % / test %)
67/33
50/50
33/66
Split (train % / test %)
67/33
50/50
33/66

CIC-IDS
Train Time/Std Dev Test Time/Std Dev
25.259/2.651
0.093/0.002
16.176/2.234
0.067/0.002
10.422/1.783
0.042/0.007
KDD
Train Time/Std Dev Test Time/Std Dev
10.439/0.797
0.175/0.029
6.712/1.264
0.120/0.0006
3.780/0.934
0.0869/0.0134

Table 2.3. Computational performance on the entire CIC-IDS and KDD data sets. The IP
addresses are excluded from the CIC-IDS data set. All times are in seconds.

8.530% for the decision tree. The average score is 85.289% and the standard deviation is
9.541% for the random forest.
We also tested classification using the kNN algorithm. Like the decision tree algorithm,
kNN is a supervised machine learning model. Many accuracy and speed improvements in
anomaly detection have come from the use of kNN for classification [25]. Figure 2.3 provides
a comparison between the three models we tested. The left side of the figure shows how the
decision tree and random forest compare as a function of kNN. The right side of the figure
shows how random forest and kNN compare as a function of the decision tree. Random forest
showed better generalization than the decision tree and kNN. The decision tree performed
better than random forest. kNN had the worst run time at over 660 seconds on average.
This run time is over 9 times longer than the decision tree, which was almost 4 times longer
than random forest.
2.3.2 Feature Reduction
Raw network data are quite verbose. Reducing the data to relevant features is critical for
obtaining high classification accuracy. This process comprises feature reduction techniques.
The idea is to drop features which do not provide adequate variance in the data. The
remaining features then provide enough variance to achieve reasonable classification accuracy.
There are benefits and drawbacks to feature reduction. Benefits include simpler models,
improved accuracy, and a reduction of the effects of high dimension data. High dimension
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Training Days
Tue
Wed
Fri
Mon
Thu
Tue, Wed
Tue, Fri
Tue, Mon
Tue, Thu
Wed, Fri
Wed, Mon
Wed, Thu
Fri, Mon
Fri, Thu
Mon, Thu
Tue, Wed, Fri
Tue, Wed, Mon
Tue, Wed, Thu
Tue, Fri, Mon
Tue, Fri, Thu
Tue, Mon, Thu
Wed, Fri, Mon
Wed, Fri, Thu
Wed, Mon, Thu
Fri, Mon, Thu
Tue, Wed, Fri, Mon
Tue, Wed, Fri, Thu
Tue, Wed, Mon, Thu
Tue, Fri, Mon, Thu
Wed, Fri, Mon, Thu

Test Days
Wed, Fri, Mon, Thu
Tue, Fri, Mon, Thu
Tue, Wed, Mon, Thu
Tue, Wed, Fri, Thu
Tue, Wed, Fri, Mon
Fri, Mon, Thu
Wed, Mon, Thu
Wed, Fri, Thu
Wed, Fri, Mon
Tue, Mon, Thu
Tue, Fri, Thu
Tue, Fri, Mon
Tue, Wed, Thu
Tue, Wed, Mon
Tue, Wed, Fri
Mon, Thu
Fri, Thu
Fri, Mon
Wed, Thu
Wed, Mon
Wed, Fri
Tue, Thu
Tue, Mon
Tue, Fri
Tue, Wed
Thu
Mon
Fri
Wed
Tue

Full Dataset
Score
80.877
88.927
87.455
79.509
80.317
85.924
83.097
75.356
83.761
97.38
85.357
85.525
86.78
84.747
74.943
96.635
81.212
81.822
75.948
79.997
67.535
96.674
98.197
79.075
77.142
92.343
99.958
68.913
80.21
96.613

Reduced Dataset
Score
78.008
85.649
90.464
79.509
80.163
85.383
88.793
75.082
76.353
94.021
82.477
84.445
84.854
87.733
74.493
95.410
78.537
81.738
79.835
84.532
67.405
93.566
96.038
78.537
80.640
92.620
98.669
69.368
72.858
93.392

Table 2.4. Generalization on the power set of per-day full and feature-reduced CIC-IDS data
sets using the decision tree. IP addresses are excluded from the full data set. All scores are
percentages.

data suffers from the so-called “curse of dimensionality” [26]. This problem affects machine
learning when the data lacks enough samples for combinations of all the features. Removing
unnecessary features eases the effects of an insufficient amount of samples. Feature reduction
can also enable the use of other machine learning models. Removing unnecessary features
can remove the noise from data, but can remove the signal as well. This can cause a close
grouping of the data, destroying the variance and reducing accuracy.
Reducing the size of the data set is a practical advantage of feature reduction. Net-
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Training Days
Tue
Wed
Fri
Mon
Thu
Tue, Wed
Tue, Fri
Tue, Mon
Tue, Thu
Wed, Fri
Wed, Mon
Wed, Thu
Fri, Mon
Fri, Thu
Mon, Thu
Tue, Wed, Fri
Tue, Wed, Mon
Tue, Wed, Thu
Tue, Fri, Mon
Tue, Fri, Thu
Tue, Mon, Thu
Wed, Fri, Mon
Wed, Fri, Thu
Wed, Mon, Thu
Fri, Mon, Thu
Tue, Wed, Fri, Mon
Tue, Wed, Fri, Thu
Tue, Wed, Mon, Thu
Tue, Fri, Mon, Thu
Wed, Fri, Mon, Thu

Test Days
Wed, Fri, Mon, Thu
Tue, Fri, Mon, Thu
Tue, Wed, Mon, Thu
Tue, Wed, Fri, Thu
Tue, Wed, Fri, Mon
Fri, Mon, Thu
Wed, Mon, Thu
Wed, Fri, Thu
Wed, Fri, Mon
Tue, Mon, Thu
Tue, Fri, Thu
Tue, Fri, Mon
Tue, Wed, Thu
Tue, Wed, Mon
Tue, Wed, Fri
Mon, Thu
Fri, Thu
Fri, Mon
Wed, Thu
Wed, Mon
Wed, Fri
Tue, Thu
Tue, Mon
Tue, Fri
Tue, Wed
Thu
Mon
Fri
Wed
Tue

Full Data set
Score
80.820
88.279
89.428
79.509
80.290
86.265
88.634
75.341
76.382
98.760
84.551
87.385
87.852
92.390
74.098
99.686
82.148
83.580
79.568
86.313
67.393
95.620
98.590
78.830
82.956
99.656
99.963
69.378
68.704
96.316

Reduced Data set
Score
77.797
86.399
90.706
79.509
80.197
86.010
89.313
75.343
76.361
95.674
83.806
84.629
87.679
88.274
74.512
98.333
80.776
82.038
82.069
84.840
67.393
95.392
96.190
78.508
82.808
97.864
98.879
69.629
71.761
93.523

Table 2.5. Generalization on the power set of per-day full and feature-reduced CIC-IDS data
sets using a random forest with 10 estimators. IP addresses are excluded from the full data
set. All scores are percentages.

work flow data can easily exceed gigabytes per day, and threat detection requires rapid and
accurate response to be useful. Therefore, minimizing the size of the data has important
practical effects.
We applied Principal Components Analysis (PCA) [27] and the entropy and information
gain metrics from the ID3 algorithm [28] to both data sets and were able to significantly
reduce the number of features while retaining the same level of accuracy. Applying PCA can
obscure the connection between the reduced data set and the original. PCA can also “load”
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Figure 2.3. Performance comparison for the different models. Random forest performs the
best, but only by a small margin.

the first principal component with the highest variance which makes the reduced data set
non-optimal. The remaining components thus no longer provide an accurate interpretation of
the original data. Measuring information gain is useful for working around these limitations.
In doing so, we can arrive at a set of features that are the most characteristic of attacks.
Table 2.6 shows the results of applying the ID3 entropy and information gain metrics
to varying sample sizes for both data sets. The KDD data does not show an interesting
result since the initial feature chosen is the same for all three sample sizes. Both algorithms
select the same initial feature for the first split. The CIC-IDS result varies as the sample
size increases until the initial feature is ultimately the same for all data sets.
Figure 2.4 shows the per-feature variance for all five days of the CIC-IDS data. All
features have been scaled to the range [0,1] so that the largest value of each feature is
scaled to unit size. It is obvious that many features have a small variance and can thus be
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Figure 2.4. The variance of all flow features. All values have been scaled to the range [0, 1].

eliminated. Further feature reduction could be based on a variance threshold or some other
criteria.
We applied PCA to the CIC-IDS data and reduced the number of features from 85
to 5. The largest eigenvalue corresponded with the Backward Inter Arrival Time (IAT)
Total feature. The second largest was Flow Bytes per second. The third largest was Flow
Duration. The fourth largest was Forward IAT Total. The last was Forward IAT Max. We
reduced the KDD data set from 41 features to 2. The largest eigenvalues corresponded with
the Source Bytes and Destination Bytes features. It is worth noting that the ID3 splitting
algorithm always chose Destination Bytes as the best feature to split on in Table 2.6.
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Data set
CIC-IDS Monday
CIC-IDS Tuesday
CIC-IDS Wednesday
CIC-IDS Thursday
CIC-IDS Friday
CIC-IDS Full data set
KDD Full data set

1,000 Samples
Flow Bytes/second
Flow Packets/second
Source Port
Flow Bytes/second
Source Port
Fwd Packets/second
Destination Bytes

5,000 Samples
Flow Bytes/second
Source Port
Source Port
Flow Bytes/second
Source Port
Flow Bytes/second
Destination Bytes

10,000 Samples
Flow Bytes/second
Flow Bytes/second
Flow Bytes/second
Flow Bytes/second
Flow Bytes/second
Flow Bytes/second
Destination Bytes

Table 2.6. Feature reduction on the CIC-IDS and KDD data sets using the ID3 entropy and
information gain metrics. The given feature for each data set is the initial feature to split
on.

We retrained the decision tree on both reduced data sets. Table 2.7 shows the results
in a format comparable to Table 2.2. The accuracy on the CIC-IDS data set increased by
an average of 0.097% while the accuracy on the KDD data set decreased by an average of
2.79%.

Split (train % / test %)
67/33
50/50
33/66

Accuracy/Std Dev
98.005/0.020
97.929/0.014
97.828/0.032

Split (train % / test %)
67/33
50/50
33/66

Accuracy/Std Dev
97.176/0.044
97.182/0.031
97.203/0.048

CIC-IDS
Precision
98.005
97.929
97.828
KDD
Precision
97.176
97.182
97.203

Recall
98.005
97.929
97.828

F1 Score
98.005
97.929
97.828

Recall
97.176
97.182
97.203

F1 Score
97.176
97.182
97.203

Table 2.7. Cross-validated performance on the feature reduced CIC-IDS and KDD data
sets. The features used in the CIC-IDS data set are Bwd IAT Total, Flow Bytes/sec, Flow
Duration, Fwd IAT Total, and Fwd IAT Max. The features used in the KDD data set are
Source Bytes and Destination Bytes. All scores are percentages.

We then tested generalization on the reduced per-day CIC-IDS data set for the decision
tree and random forest. The rightmost column in Table 2.4 shows the decision tree results.
Accuracy decreased by an average of 0.72% with a standard deviation of 9.541%. The
rightmost column in Table 2.5 shows the random forest results. Accuracy decreased once
again, this time by an average of 0.74% and a standard deviation of 8.728%.
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2.4

Conclusions
We’ve shown that decision trees provide good performance in estimating attacks. De-

cision trees can yield accuracy as high as 95% [29]. Like all machine learning models, decision trees are prone to overfitting [30]. To avoid this, we applied dimensionality reduction
techniques as discussed in Section 2.3.2. The lack of stationarity in the data means that
traditional machine learning models will not generalize well. This presents a problem when
an attack signal is present only in certain features. When using a decision tree, the result is
that features near the top of the tree for one day are lower down for other days. There are
two possible approaches to fixing this. The first is to increase the size of the training set to
more than a day and retrain the model after some time. This way, the model is aware of
malicious traffic and the structure of the tree can adapt. We observed this lack of awareness
when the accuracy on the model trained on the Monday data dropped from 96.897% for
Tuesday to 63.524% for Wednesday. The cause of this was the fact that Monday’s data were
all benign and no traffic for Wednesday was benign. We intend to explore ways of determining the optimal size of this training set. The second is to explore models that do generalize
well. Based on our previous work in [31], the Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) is a
good choice.
Feature reduction provides a powerful means of reducing the data to the features that
are most characteristic of attacks. 85 features were reduced to 5 significant ones with this
data, which suggests that the data are highly redundant. This process must be applied
iteratively to the data. Doing so systematically eliminates high-variance features that do
not contribute to the discrimination between benign and malicious traffic.
The results shown in Table 2.7 suggest two possible findings related to our feature
reduction efforts. First, the reduced CIC-IDS data set features are close to those most
characteristic of attacks. Second, the reduction in features for the KDD data set was too
aggressive. It is obvious that both reduced data sets need further feature engineering. For
this paper, our goal was to show the effects of feature reduction. We intend to explore
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ways of adding useful features without adding redundancy and retaining the performance
improvement that comes with feature reduction.
The overall decrease in accuracy shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 compared to the increase
for cross-validated training on the entire data set (shown in Table 2.7) strongly suggests that
the non-stationarity affects the accuracy of the results. The changes of the accuracy in the
power set data between the reduced and full data sets are not uniform, sometimes increasing
and sometimes decreasing. This suggests a complicated interaction between feature selection
and stationarity. It may be interesting to explore this effect on larger and more complete
data sets in future work.
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PART 3

ATTACK DETECTION AND GENERALIZATION USING DEEP
LEARNING

In Chapter 2, we showed that conventional machine learning models are unable to cope
with the lack of stationarity in the network flow data. The relationship between time and
whether benign or attack traffic is present is a feature that is not explicitly present in the
data; that is, this feature exists in the latent space of the data. Conventional models are
able to learn latent features. However, as we showed in the previous chapter, these models
are unable to generalize on the data. Further, even applying feature reduction, a common
practice used to speed up training, provided no benefit. We concluded that more powerful
models are needed.
Deep learning makes use of Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) and provides a powerful
way to learn from nearly any type of data imaginable. Deep learning models can work with
or without the notion of time. Recurrent neural networks (RNN) are a good model if the
recent past matters more than the distant past. This is useful when certain DDoS attacks
exhibit a “ramp up” period. A Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) is a good model if
specific attack attributes are more important than temporality. CNNs learn feature maps,
which are translation invariant. Once a CNN learns the features of benign traffic, detecting
malicious attack traffic is made easier.
In this chapter, we analyze the DDoS Evaluation Data set published by Sharafaldin
et al. in [1] (hereafter referred to as the CIC-DDoS data set). This data set consists of
13 different attacks over two days of collection. We also analyze the Intrusion Detection
Evaluation Data set published by Sharafaldin et al. in [22]. This data set consists of 15
different attacks over a week of collection. Both data sets include benign background traffic,
which mimics typical user behavior. The Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data set is hereafter

29

referred to as the CIC-IDS data set.
Time series analysis is an important machine learning problem. When a variable is
measured sequentially in time over or at a fixed interval, the resulting data form a time
series [32]. Both the CIC-DDoS and CIC-IDS data sets are organized into time series data.
Time series data includes trends and seasonality. Trends are increases and decreases of the
observed variable over time. Seasonality is the presence of repeating patterns or cycles in
the data.
In this research, we found that a variety of attacks could be identified with high accuracy
compared to previous approaches. We show that a CNN can be implemented for this problem
that is suitable for large volumes of data while maintaining useful levels of accuracy. We
also propose a new technique for representing flow data that is suitable as input for a CNN.
The next section provides an overview of deep learning. Readers with a background in
deep learning can skip to Section 3.2 if desired.

3.1

An Overview of Deep Learning
All of the previously discussed machine learning algorithms and techniques are con-

sidered “shallow learning”, since they consist of a single algorithm which is used for classification, regression, or clustering. In contrast, in deep learning, networks of algorithms
(typically logistic regression units) are connected in a hierarchical structure where each subsequent layer learns higher-level features from the data set. Several architectures for deep
learning exist, such as convolutional neural networks, deep belief networks, and recurrent
neural networks, to name a few.
Deep learning networks are functionally similar to existing artificial neural networks,
and an overview of artificial neural networks is provided in the following section.
3.1.1 Artificial Neural Networks
Artificial neural networks (commonly referred to simply as “neural networks” or “neural
nets” in the context of machine learning) are sets of computational units (neurons) which
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form a connected network, similar to the structure of the human brain. A typical artificial
neural network is shown in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1. An Artificial Neural Network.

Several important properties of neural networks are shown in the figure. First, three
layers exist in the network, and are separated by the dashed boxes. These are, from the left
of the figure to the right, the input layer (sometimes called the “visible” layer), hidden layer,
and output layer. Note that the hidden layer contains two sets of hidden units; in larger
networks, it could contain thousands of hidden units. The second property of the network is
that no two neurons in the same layer are connected to each other. Thus, connections between
layers are bipartite graphs. Lastly, the bold arrows at the top and bottom of the figure
indicate the directions taken by forward propagation and back propagation, respectively.
Forward propagation is performed when data arrives at the input layer and is “fed” along
the network until it reaches the output layer. Back propagation is performed after an error
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measurement is taken between the output of the network and the training data set. In
this step, the outputs are fed backwards into the network towards the input layer until the
hidden neurons arrive at an acceptable error level. This is analogous to gradient descent,
but is performed in parallel on all hidden neurons until they can accurately represent the
input data.
The perceptron is the most basic unit in a neural network and consists of an input
vector, a weight vector, a bias, and a nonlinear activation function. An example of a simple
perceptron is shown in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2. A simple perceptron.

In the figure, the set of x1 , ..., x4 denotes the input vector, the set of w1 , ..., w4 denotes
the weight vector, and f (x) is the output of some nonlinear activation function, G. Not
shown in the figure are the biases attached to the input nodes. These perform the same
function as described in Section 2.1.2. The output of the perceptron is either 0 or 1, making
it a binary classifier for linear inputs. The perceptron uses the Heaviside step function as
an activation function. The perceptron is often referred to as a “single-layer” perceptron
to distinguish it from the more commonly used multilayer perceptron. The term multilayer
perceptron is a bit of a misnomer - it is not simply several single-layer perceptrons connected
together. Instead, an MLP is a network including an input layer, a hidden layer, and an
output layer that can perform classification or regression and can use any available activation
function. The sigmoid function is the most commonly used activation function and is the
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same function used in logistic regression as described in Section 2.1.2. Pictorially, the MLP
resembles Figure 3.1.
The model for a single-layer perceptron can be expressed as the following:

f (x) = G(W T x + b)

(3.1)

In Equation 3.1, G is the activation function (the Heaviside step function), W T is the
transpose of the weight vector, and b is the bias. Importantly, the x variable is a vector, not
a single value.
3.1.2 Deep Learning Networks
As previously mentioned, several architectures for deep learning exist: convolutional
neural networks, deep belief networks, and recurrent neural networks, to name a few.
Convolutional neural networks modify the connectivity shown in Figure 3.1 so that
only contiguous neurons from a previous layer are connected to successive layers. This
arrangement is called a receptive field [33]. A receptive field of size 2 in Figure 3.1 would
then connect neurons Input 1 and Input 2 to Hidden 1, and Hidden 1 and Hidden 2
to Hidden 5, for example. The convolutional property of this deep learning network has
some application to this research and is expected to be featured in at least one publication.
Deep belief networks are a modification of restricted Boltzmann machines. The typical
RBM consists of a visible layer of neurons and a hidden layer of neurons which model the
joint distribution of both layers. A DBN modifies this by adding additional hidden layers
to the network. These new hidden layers serve as visible layer inputs to successive hidden
layers. As shown by Hinton, et. al in [34], these DBNs can more effectively reduce the
dimensionality in a set of data compared to techniques like principal components analysis.
This is important for this research since network flow data has a large number of features
and it is desired to eliminate those that don’t contribute to accurate anomaly detection.
Recurrent neural networks are well suited for processing sequential data such as time
series data. This makes them a natural fit for processing network flow data, which is inher-
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ently sequential and time series-based. RNNs differ from traditional deep learning networks
since they do not use the back propagation algorithm. Instead, a feedback loop from the
previous layer affects the output of the current layer [35]. This feature is paired with a type
of memory called Long Short-Term Memory. This differs from the forward propagation in
typical networks since LSTM is dynamic and lives outside the network, whereas forward
propagation is a part of the network and produces a static representation of the data [35].
It is expected that RNNs will be a part of this research due to their capability to model
sequential data.

3.2

Methodology
In this research, we show that deep learning achieves far greater accuracy compared to

shallow models. We show that contemporary deep learning models can be trained on large
data sets in a reasonable amount of time. We show that attack detection accuracy improves
in some situations when using a per-destination classifier. We introduce a new technique
to turn individual traffic flows into images for 2D CNNs. This technique provides a way to
better distinguish different types of traffic. This technique helps detect even low rate attacks.
Low rate attacks can go undetected by conventional mitigation systems, yet they remain a
valid threat. We show that DDOS attacks can be recognized in advance (forward prediction)
with robust high accuracy. The general IDS problem still remains difficult, probably because
of the complexity of the attacks and the relatively small volume of each IDS attack.
Our goal is not to compare our work with the state of the art in deep learning. Rather,
we aim to show that deep learning models significantly outperform shallow models while
still performing well enough to handle huge volumes of data. Deep learning models and
techniques learn powerful representations of their input data. This includes relationships
that may exist outside the explicit feature space. We conclude that intrusion and DDoS
detection using shallow models is impractical.
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3.3

Experiment
The CIC-DDoS data set contains several comma-separated value (CSV) files spanning

two days of collection. The training set consists of traffic captured on January 12th, 2019.
The validation set consists of traffic captured on March 11th, 2019. A taxonomy of the
attacks present in the data is shown in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3. A taxonomy of the attacks present in the CIC-DDoS data set [1]
.

A number of issues were present in the data that required fixes before applying machine
learning. We dropped two columns, “Unnamed: 0” and “SimillarHTTP”, from the data
since they did not contain useful information. In some cases, columns such as “Flow Bytes/s”
and “Flow Packets/s” contained a few non-numeric values with floating point values for the
remaining data. The March 11th “UDP.csv” and “UDPLag.csv” files seemed to be corrupted
and were omitted from all testing. We applied similar techniques to clean and prepare the
CIC-IDS data set. Since we used binary classifiers, we changed the class name of any attack
flows to “attack”. The flows with a class name of “benign” were not changed.
We created three different sample data sets with data drawn from both the CIC-DDoS
data set and CIC-IDS data set. Each sample data set was further broken down into training
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Name
DDoS-Random
DDoS-Single-Destination
DDoS-Multiday
IDS-Random
IDS-Single-Destination
IDS-Multiday

Sample Size
1,600,000
1,600,000
2,100,000
700,000
645,592
2,100,000

Purpose
Random data from all attack types, sources, and destinations
Attacks aimed at a specific target
Generalization across multiple capture days
Random data from all attack types, sources, and destinations
Attacks aimed at a specific target
Generalization across multiple capture days

Table 3.1. Sample data sets for the CIC-DDoS and CIC-IDS data sets. For each source
CSV file, 100,000 random samples were taken without replacement.

and testing data sets. The first data set consists of random samples drawn from all collection
days with no replacement. The second data set consists of all flows with the most common
destination IP address. For the CIC-DDoS data set, the IP address is 192.168.50.1. For the
CIC-IDS data set, the IP address is 192.168.10.3. The third data set consists of data from
different days. All three sample data sets are intended to assess the generalization power of
the deep learning models. The third data set in particular presents a test of temporality.
Details of the evaluation data sets are shown in Table 3.1.
3.3.1 Neural Network Details
We created four different neural network models for testing: A feed-forward Artificial
Neural Network (ANN), a RNN, a 1-dimensional CNN (1D CNN), and a 2-dimensional CNN
(2D CNN). These models are adept at learning different characteristics of the input data.
Table 3.2 provides a summary of the common hyperparameters used by all models.
The ANN learns the global characteristics of the entire training data set. That is,
specific representations of the data are extracted at each layer. The loss function allows the
network to learn which features are relevant. Shallow learning techniques, by comparison,
typically require feature engineering before machine learning is applied. Our ANN model
is comprised of three densely connected layers. The first two layers have 128 neurons each.
The last layer serves as the output layer, where a classification decision is made. The ANN
serves as the baseline for performance comparisons. By using the ANN as a baseline, the
utility of the other models is established. This justifies the added complexity and run time
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of the other models.
ANNs, although simple compared to other models, are still quite powerful for DDoS
detection. NG et al. approach the identification of DoS and DDoS attacks by ANN feature
learning using the radial basis function [36]. In this approach, errors from layers of ANN are
computed on the fixed number of network flow features as an additional regulator on the
radial loss function.
Parameter
Batch Size
Neurons Per Layer
Optimizer
Hidden Layer Activation Function
Output Layer Activation Function
Loss Function
Training Epochs
Train/Test data split

Value
128
32-512 depending on model
RMSProp
ReLU
Sigmoid
Binary Cross Entropy
5
66% / 33%

Table 3.2. Hyperparameters common to all models.

The RNN is desirable for sequence classification and time-series prediction. Our RNN
model consists of four layers. The first layer is an embedding layer. It embeds the input
vectors into a Euclidean space. Similar vectors tend to lie closer while dissimilar vectors are
more distant. The next two layers consist of Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) cells. We
compared the performance of LSTM cells to Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) cells. We were
specifically interested in whether the vanishing gradient problem (described in [37]) might
appear. We found no difference in performance between LSTM and GRU. The last layer
serves as the output layer.
The 1D CNN consists of eight layers. The first layer is an embedding layer similar to the
one used by the RNN described previously. The next two layers consist of a 1D convolution
layer and pooling layer. The convolution layer uses a kernel size of 5 for generating feature
maps. In our testing, kernel sizes between 5 and 7 worked best. Smaller values caused a
decrease in accuracy and larger values showed negligible improvements in accuracy. The
pooling layer sub-samples the filters produced by the 1D convolution layer. The next two
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layers consist of similar convolution and pooling layers. The next layer performs regularization using dropout at a 50% dropout rate. As before, the last layer serves as the output
layer.
The 2D CNN consists of twelve layers. The first eight layers are 2D convolution and
pooling layers, respectively. The convolution layers use 3 × 3 kernels for generating feature
maps. The pooling layers use a pool size 2 × 2. The next layer flattens the output of the
pooling layer into 1D vectors. The next layer is a densely connected layer consisting of
512 neurons. The next layer performs regularization using dropout at a 50% dropout rate.
Finally, the last layer serves as the output layer.
For all models, the sigmoid activation function is used at the last layer for binary
classification. All models use the Root Mean Square Propagation (RMSProp) optimizer.
The densely connected layers use Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) activations. The loss function
is binary cross entropy. The cross entropy function [38] is defined in Equation 3.2.

CE = −

N
X

ti log(si )

i

t ∈ {i, 1 − i}

(3.2)

s ∈ {î, 1 − î}
In Equation 3.2, t is the set of ground-truth labels and s is the set of predictions. The
sum is over N classes.
3.3.2 Spectrogram-based Flow Representation
Spectrograms provide a visualization of the frequencies contained in a signal over time.
The most common way to generate a spectrogram is by using the fast Fourier transform
(FFT). The resulting image can be thought of as a heat map of the signal magnitude over
time. The heat map provides a visual representation of the frequency space (or spectrum)
of the input signal.
The underlying discrete Fourier transform (DFT) provides better output for periodic
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signals. This is due to the assumption of periodicity in the resulting basis functions. We first
tried generating spectrogram images with no modifications to the flow data. The resulting
images were difficult to distinguish. This was due to the small frequency domain represented
by the real-valued feature columns in the flow data. We thus introduced artificial periodicity
by repeating the flow data for each flow. Introducing artificial periodicity does not expand
the resulting frequency domain. Instead, it provides a larger sample space from which to
derive the frequency domain. A spectrogram image was generated from the resulting flow.
The conversion process is detailed in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: Flow Conversion to Spectrogram Image
1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

D ←− read input flow data
train split ←− d0.66 × Drows e
test split ←− d0.33 × Drows e
Fs = 200.0 /* the sampling frequency

*/

/* This loop is run on the training and test data

*/

for i ←− 0 to train split do
row ←− Di
S ←− smooth the data in row using exponential smoothing
Sneg ←− flip the signs on the data in S
S ←− concatenate S and Sneg
N F F T ←− length of S
S 0 ←− repeat S twice
Sout ←− spectrogram of S 0 using N F F T data points sampled at Fs
Save Sout as an image with a unique file name (a version 4 UUID value) under a
directory with the flow’s label

The algorithm works as follows. For each sample data set listed in Table 3.1 the sizes of
the training and test data sets are computed. The sampling frequency is set at 200 samples
per second. Each row in the training and test data sets has several transformations applied.
The data in the row is first smoothed. A copy of the row is made and the signs of each
value are flipped to introduce artificial periodicity (i.e. to approximate a periodic signal).
The original row and negated row are concatenated together. The sample size (NFFT) is
computed from the concatenated result. The concatenated result is repeated twice to create
a larger input signal. A spectrogram image is generated on the result. This image is given
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a unique file name and saved under a directory named with the flow’s class name (either
“benign” or “attack”).

Figure 3.4. A Spectrogram Image of Good Traffic

We generated 150x150 pixel spectrogram images from the sample data sets listed in
Table 3.1. Each image represents a single unique traffic flow from the data. A sample of
“good” and “bad” traffic flows is shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.5, respectively.

Figure 3.5. A Spectrogram Image of Bad Traffic

Images of the same class showed minor differences in appearance. A few of the images
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in different classes showed some common features. Most had very distinct features, an
important quality for the 2D CNN. The resulting image data for the CIC-DDoS and CICIDS data sets was over 100 Gigabytes in size.

3.4

Results

Figure 3.6. A summary of model performance on the CIC-DDoS sample data sets. For
the multiday samples, (fwd) refers to predictive learning and (rev) refers to retrospective
learning.
We applied the neural networks described in Section 3.3.1 to the text and image sample
data sets (as described in Table 3.1) as appropriate. We found that each model began
overfitting each of the sample data sets after only a few training epochs. We therefore ran
each model for five epochs as a single “iteration”. Each model was run for 10 iterations.
All models achieved at least 90% training accuracy on all the sample data sets with some
achieving 100% accuracy.
A summary of per-model performance on the CIC-DDoS data set is shown in Figure
3.6. A summary of per-model performance on the CIC-IDS data set is shown in Figure 3.7.
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The CIC-DDoS results show that the binary baseline accuracy is met and exceeded by
the other models, justifying their additional complexity.For the ANN, a global representation
is learned. The RNN learns relationships between items in a sequence. Finally, the CNN
learns local features (so-called “feature maps”). Our use of more complex models is to
determine whether a more granular representation of the data yields better performance.
The ANN runtimes are the lowest compared to the other models. This is expected since it
is the least complex model.
The CIC-IDS results also show that the baseline accuracy is exceeded by all classifiers.
The runtimes for all models are similar to the CIC-DDoS results.
3.4.1 Class percentages

Figure 3.7. A summary of model performance on the CIC-IDS sample data sets. For the
multiday samples, (fwd) refers to predictive learning and (rev) refers to retrospective learning.
The performance discrepancies between the CIC-DDoS results and CIC-IDS results were
concerning. The same models and methods were used on both sample data sets. We would
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thus expect to see similar results.
We investigated the distribution of classes in all of the sample data sets. For the
CIC-DDoS samples, the “syn” attack comprises 37.4% of the total traffic, followed by the
“netbios” attack at 21%. The percentage of “benign” class traffic (less than 1% of the total
traffic) is extremely low relative to the other classes. We conclude from this that the models
do not have sufficient training data to learn the “benign” class. Therefore, classification
performance suffers.
The class distribution in the CIC-IDS samples is more balanced. The “benign” class
comprises 83% of all traffic. This gives all models sufficient samples to create a representation
of benign versus attack traffic. The “portscan” attack was the second most prevalent at 10%
of the total traffic. Most of the remaining attack classes have low percentages. Others, such
as the “web attack” classes, have no samples. These conditions are more representative of
real world conditions since they can represent low volume and ramp-up attack traffic.
3.4.2 Accuracy comparisons using the Matthews Correlation Coefficient
Training on the unbalanced data will result in a classifier that is skewed towards the
majority class. The Matthews correlation coefficient (MCC) attempts to remedy this [39].
The MCC is a good alternative to F1 scores and ROC curves for comparing training quality
[40]. It provides a more concise measure of a classifier’s performance compared to a confusion
matrix. The MCC value is the normalized determinant of the confusion matrix. The MCC
measure is expressed in Equation 3.3.
tp × tn − f p × f n
M CC = p
(tp + f p)(tp + f n)(tn + f p)(tn + f n)

(3.3)

We captured the MCC values for all the models on all of the sample data sets. The
results are shown in Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9. For the CIC-DDoS data set, the ANN
and RNN provide the best classifications, respectively. For the CIC-IDS data set, the RNN
significantly outperforms the other models. These results provide a very different perspective
compared to the other measures. The class imbalances between the data sets described in
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Figure 3.8. Matthews correlation coefficients for all models on the CIC-DDoS sample data
sets. Higher values are better. For the multiday samples, (fwd) refers to predictive learning
and (rev) refers to retrospective learning.

Section 3.4.1 are less of a factor in the MCC results.
3.4.3 Generalization
How well a given model generalizes to new and unseen data is important. This is
especially true for new attack types. The MCC results in Section 3.4.2 provide some insights
into how each model performs. Table 3.3 shows more granular per-sample and per-model
performance results.
For each data set sample and model, the training accuracy, loss, and runtime are shown.
We also captured multiday performance values for each data set (denoted as “M.D.”). These
values show how well each model handles the temporal nature of the attack data. This aspect
of the data is important since network traffic patterns tend to vary based on time and day.
The multiday results capture both predictive and retrospective (denoted by fwd and rev,
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Figure 3.9. Matthews correlation coefficients for all models on the CIC-IDS sample data
sets. Higher values are better.

respectively) learning.
For the CIC-DDoS data set samples, the average predictive accuracy for all models is
90.8%. For retrospective learning, the accuracy drops to 85.5%. For the CIC-IDS data set
samples, the average predictive accuracy for all models is 91.4%. For retrospective learning,
the accuracy is slightly increased to 91.6%. We therefore conclude that the models are
capable of generalizing on the data.
These results are far better than our previous work using shallow learning methods [41],
where in some cases, accuracy dropped by 30% or more. Dimensionality reduction caused a
further loss of generalization accuracy which showed that the effects were due to an inability
of the shallow algorithms to capture the essential features of the data.
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Sample Name
DDoS-Rand
DDoS-S.D.
DDoS-M.D. (fwd)
DDoS-M.D. (rev)
IDS-Rand
IDS-S.D.
IDS-M.D. (fwd)
IDS-M.D. (rev)

Acc.
84.8
99.4
99.6
94.0
82.3
73.7
83.8
80.5

Sample Name
DDoS-Rand
DDoS-S.D.
DDoS-M.D. (fwd)
DDoS-M.D. (rev)
IDS-Rand
IDS-S.D.
IDS-M.D. (fwd)
IDS-M.D. (rev)

Acc.
77.3
100.0
99.9
91.5
91.1
83.6
87.4
86.9

ANN
Loss Train Time
27
1102
26
1060
49
1440
61
1001
53
469
34
423
43
1692
25
1779
1D CNN
Loss Train Time
53
1481
0
1482
21
2021
39
1410
55
629
31
580
58
2333
60
2508

Acc.
99.4
100.0
99.9
95.7
91.5
86.9
88.1
85.7
Acc.
90.6
100.0
99.4
92.6
83.8
75.9
85.1
80.8

RNN
Loss Train Time
29
34853
0
34954
0
50593
60
24791
51
15172
50
14186
63
50276
44
56411
2D CNN
Loss Train Time
51
79237
10
79671
15
15712
39
17948
30
28941
36
26321
50
49793
32
54929

Table 3.3. Performance results for the CIC-DDoS and CIC-IDS sample data sets. Accuracy
and loss are expressed in percent. Training time is expressed in seconds.

3.4.4 Low Rate Attacks
Low rate attacks are carried out by sending malicious packets at a much lower rate
than a typical high rate attack. The attacker’s goal is to carry out the attack while avoiding
detection. Attackers use a variety of techniques in low rate attacks. Examples include
opening partial connection requests or sending small packets to maintain open connections,
to name a few.
We examined the “Flow Packets per second” column present in both the CIC-DDoS
and CIC-IDS data set samples. For each attack, we computed the average of the Flow
Packets per second. Packets per second (pps) is a good measure of the sending rate since it
is independent of the packet size. For the CIC-DDoS data set samples, the NTP attack had
the lowest average pps rate at 186,061. All of the attacks in the CIC-IDS data set samples
had an average pps value of 1,209,995. Due to this, only the CIC-DDoS data set samples
were considered.
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Table 3.4 shows the MCC values for the NTP attack for all models and all sample data
sets. All models show reasonable performance since there are no negative MCC values. The
ANN outperforms the other models, especially with the multiday samples. The RNN provides the second best result in all cases. The 1D CNN provides good multiday performance,
suggesting that the NTP attack does not vary significantly over time. The 2D CNN shows
average performance. This suggests that while the spectrogram approach works, the NTP
images are not distinct enough from the other classes. Further refinement of Algorithm 3
could yield better distinction between classes.
lightgray Data set
DDoS-M.D. (rev)

DDoS-M.D. (fwd)

DDoS-Rand

DDoS-S.D.

Model
ANN
CNN1D
CNN2D
RNN
ANN
CNN1D
CNN2D
RNN
ANN
CNN1D
CNN2D
RNN
ANN
CNN1D
CNN2D
RNN

MCC
0.666
0.332
0.000
0.518
0.993
0.603
0.001
0.814
0.197
0.003
0.002
0.162
0.189
0.000
0.003
0.168

Table 3.4. MCC values for each model and each sample DDoS data set for the low rate
NTP attack. Higher values are better. For the multiday samples, (fwd) refers to predictive
learning and (rev) refers to retrospective learning.

3.5

Conclusions
We showed that a variety of neural networks provide good classification performance

against network attack data. The generalization capabilities of neural networks exceed those
of shallow learning methods. Each of the models outperformed the shallow models in our
previous work.
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Figure 3.8 shows that DDOS attacks can be recognized prior to observing samples of
the individual attack. This suggests that there is a common temporal or structural feature
to DDOS attacks which can be learned and used to effectively protect networks from DDOS.
Figure 3.9 shows that the general IDS problem is more difficult. While reasonable
accuracy can be obtained, shown in figure 3.7, the classifier over predicted IDS resulting in
a poor Matthew’s correlation coefficient. Still, as shown in figure 3.9 IDS Multiday (rev),
the classifiers were able to learn to identify attacks they had seen before.
We introduced a new data representation technique in using spectrograms. The 2D
CNN that makes use of these images performed well in most tests. Further refinement of the
conversion process detailed in Algorithm 3 could yield additional performance improvements.
CNNs are finding more utility in anomaly detection. In [42], Doriguzzi-Corin et al. also
use a CNN for attack detection. The CNN is combined with a data preprocessing algorithm
that transforms traffic flows into an embedding space. The embedding space is based on
traffic attributes. By transforming the input data, resource utilization and attack detection
times are decreased. Their resulting model is called LUCID. Cheng et al. use network flow
binary images combined with deep CNNs to predict DDoS attacks in [43]. Creation of the
grayscale images used as input to the CNN is based on extraction rules. The result is called a
Grayscale Matrix Feature (GMF). Their model obtains high accuracy and low false positive
and error rates.
We validated the generalization capabilities of our models using predictive and retrospective learning. We also tried using a bidirectional RNN to achieve a similar result, but the
performance difference was negligible. Generalization for all of the neural network models
outperformed the shallow models.
Binary classification is better suited for real-world scenarios. Multiclass classification
requires that all possible classes are known a priori. Such a requirement limits the effectiveness of the classifier since new or unknown attacks may mimic some properties of known
attacks. Additionally, low volume attacks may exhibit characteristics similar to other attacks. As demonstrated in Section 3.4, an imbalance of classes can significantly affect model
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performance.
All of the models we tested were sequential neural networks. Other topologies, such as
multi-input or multi-output models, could provide additional capabilities. Model ensembling
could improve performance. The 1D CNN, whose runtime was only slightly longer than the
ANN, could be used to preprocess the data before feeding it to the RNN. In doing so, the
higher level features learned by the CNN are fed as input sequences to the RNN. The short
runtime for the 1D CNN means that it is suitable for implementation on large volumes of
data. Generative learning is another possibility.
The CIC-DDoS and CIC-IDS data sets we tested had very different properties. The
most prominent is the class imbalance between them. Most real world networks will have
network traffic patterns similar to the CIC-IDS data set. However, it is quite possible that
an attack detection framework deployed on live network traffic will encounter an irregular
distribution of network traffic that it must cope with. It may be interesting to explore even
more powerful models that are capable of handling such unfavorable environments.
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PART 4

A FRAMEWORK FOR ATTACK DETECTION

The research presented in Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrates conclusively the feasibility
of detecting DDoS attacks using machine learning. In particular, Chapter 2 showed that
conventional machine learning models can learn to discriminate between benign traffic and
traffic containing a DDoS attack. However, the inability to generalize necessitated the use
of deep learning models, which was discussed in Chapter 3.
This chapter takes the knowledge obtained from the previous chapters and attempts
to create intelligent threat detection agents. These agents can be integrated into the infrastructure at the network level on up to the application level. In order to distribute the
intelligence of the agents, we propose a peer-to-peer network in which agents participate and
share threat information.

4.1

Methodology
This research explores the factors required to create intelligent distributed threat de-

tection agents. These agents are capable of performing the roles of the hardware appliances
at the application level. They are tightly integrated into the various components of the web
application stack. They distribute valuable information on attacks as they are mitigated.
The agents integrate modern machine learning into web servers and web applications.
We describe several web-based attacks to provide context to our proposed solution.
We discuss two popular Python-based machine learning frameworks. These frameworks
can be used to build intelligent threat detection agents. We propose a distributed threat
detection model for the contemporary web application stack. Finally, we discuss the potential
challenges of such a model.
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Figure 4.1. A SQL injection attack. The attacker sends a crafted payload and obtains
privileged access to the back end database.

4.2

Threat Analysis
It is important to understand common threats to understand the potential use of dis-

tributed intelligence. The number of web-based attacks is numerous and growing, so we
describe a few common attacks here.
One of the most common web attacks leverages improper or altogether missing form
validation in a web application. A number of potent attacks are possible when form inputs
are not properly validated [44]:
• Injection of SQL code, which enables an attacker to run arbitrary SQL commands on
the backend database of the website
• Cross-site scripting, which enables an attacker to post arbitrary data to a website
• Header injection, which allows an attacker to exploit forms in order to send spam
An illustration of a SQL injection attack is shown in Figure 4.1. To carry out the
attack, the attacker includes valid SQL code in the form submission. The result of the
attack depends on the payload. The attacker could corrupt the database. Sensitive data
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Figure 4.2. A CSRF attack. The attacker embeds a malicious payload into the website.
When the user logs in, their web browser automatically executes the malicious query. The
attacker obtains the result.

could be stolen. The attacker could gain privileged access to carry out further attacks. Form
validation restricts the type of data that can be entered into a form. Input checks ensure
the input data is valid for what is being requested in a given form field. Research into the
prevention of such attacks is active [45] [46].
Another common attack is a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attack. CSRF attacks
are a type of confused deputy attack. The forged requests leverage the authentication and
authorization of the victim [47]. A CSRF attack adds extra commands to a user’s request.
The extra commands perform any actions for which the user is authorized. Attacks can
change the user’s credentials. If the current user has sufficient privileges, other users can be
impersonated. These actions are performed without the user’s knowledge or consent.
Figure 4.2 shows a generalized CSRF attack. The attacker first embeds a malicious
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payload into the website’s Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) code. The code could be
as trivial as adding a password change request query as the source to an HTML image tag.
Once logged in, the victim’s web browser fetches the contents of the image tag. The victim’s
password is changed to the password specified by the attacker in the query. The victim has
no knowledge that this has occurred. The victim is a valid user so the password change
request appears legitimate from the perspective of the website.
There are many defenses against CSRF attacks [48]. The most common is to embed a
secret validation token in any requests. If a request is missing the token or the token does
not match the expected value, the server rejects the request.
These two brief examples share a caveat with the hardware appliances mentioned before.
Because the mitigations work only with known attacks, any unknown attack is likely to
succeed. The use of machine learning can help to mitigate known and unknown attacks.

4.3

Using Machine Learning Frameworks
Machine learning at the application layer can reduce many of the drawbacks of hardware

and software solutions. Security can be moved from the network perimeter to host systems.
The software solutions described in Section 4.2 gain greater protection. Training applicationlayer security against application layer threats improves the quality of the decisions.
Host-based application-layer security can substantially reduce license and operational
costs for hardware appliances. The physical footprint of the network can thus be scaled down.
Throughput scaling becomes less of a concern since host systems perform traffic inspection.
Constant signature updates on security devices is reduced or eliminated altogether. However,
our proposed model requires updates to traffic that is considered benign. Generative machine
learning models such as the restricted Boltzmann machine (RBM) are a solution to this.
Application throughput is thus limited to the host system’s bandwidth.
Many popular Open Source frameworks exist and are compatible with the application
layer. We briefly describe two popular frameworks.
Scikit-learn supports many supervised and unsupervised machine learning models.
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Figure 4.3. An intelligent threat mitigation model for a web application. The dashed lines
indicate the distribution of threat intelligence. User traffic is permitted while attacker traffic
is not.

Other supporting functionality includes data preparation and model validation. Scikit-learn
provides a Python API and is easy to learn. The use of Graphics Processing Units (GPU) is
not supported. CPU-optimized versions of the Numpy library can provide some performance
gains. Limited support for basic neural networks is available. Neural networks are not the
main focus of the library.
TensorFlow was released by the Google Brain team in 2015. In contrast to Scikitlearn, TensorFlow operates with or without a GPU. Using the GPU results in significant
speedups in learning. Tensorflow is intended to be a general-purpose numerical computation
library. Like Scikit-learn, TensorFlow can execute “shallow learning” tasks. Support for all
major neural network models is included.

4.4

A Mitigation Model
Intelligent agents can be incorporated into any component of the web application infras-

tructure. Figure 4.3 illustrates intelligent agents in multiple layers of the web application
infrastructure. The intelligent agents run on each of the components. The dashed lines
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indicate the distribution of threat intelligence among the components. Note that there is
no inter-component communication. Different components face different threats. Threat detection models thus protect specific components. A compromise of any single component’s
agents does not affect the agents for other components.
The inclusion of multiple component clusters highlights the distributed nature of the
model. This enables a geographically dispersed infrastructure for sharing threat information.
The next sections describe intelligent agents for specific web application components.
The use of the Python-based frameworks mentioned in Section 4.3 make the serialization of
object instances (i.e. “pickling an object”) trivial. Mitigation systems using either of the
frameworks could be updated asynchronously while still running.
Training and validation of machine learning models could be carried out in a nonproduction environment, and the updated models supplied to the applications. It will be
necessary to sign the updates to ensure security. Python libraries exist that support modern
digital signature algorithms.
4.4.1 Flask
Flask is a Python-based web framework used to build APIs, websites, and more. In the
model shown in Figure 4.3, an instance of Flask would run on every web server. Building an
intelligent agent using either of the two frameworks in Section 4.3 is trivial. An intelligent
agent need only check incoming requests to see if they’re potentially malicious. Requests
with suspicious content are dropped and an error is returned to the user. This results in just
two classes of requests and a linear model on which to learn.
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is a simple binary classification model that uses
convex optimization as a loss function. SGD outperforms models such as Support Vector
Machines (SVM), especially on large data sets. The intelligent agent is first trained using
SGD. Once trained, it transforms an incoming request into a feature vector, classifies it, and
returns the result. If the feature vector belongs to the malicious class, the request is dropped
and an error is returned to the user.
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4.4.2 Databases
The database intelligent agent checks incoming SQL queries before running them. Unusual or never-before-seen queries are potentially malicious. For example, if no user management exists in the web application, the agent should never receive queries against such
tables. Queries of this type are malicious and are dropped.
Building an intelligent agent for the database component using either of the two frameworks in Section 4.3 would require more effort. The agent would receive incoming SQL
queries, classify them, then pass along queries classified as benign to the SQL database. The
intelligent agent thus acts as a reverse proxy between the client applications (e.g. the web
servers in Figure 4.3) and the database.
The number of possible requests is small relative to those seen by the Flask component.
As a result, most database queries are benign. In this case, the use of an SVM is appropriate.
As before, the intelligent agent is first trained. Once trained, it transforms an incoming SQL
query into a feature vector, classifies it, and returns the result. If the feature vector belongs
to the malicious class, the SQL query is not passed along to the database and an error is
returned to the user.
4.4.3 Web servers
Web servers are the most outward facing component of the web application. Protecting
them against attacks is vitally important. Attacks against web servers tend to focus on the
web server itself instead of the content it serves. Fuzzing is a common technique where invalid
or unexpected data is provided to an application and the result is observed [49]. Attackers
combine fuzzing and known vulnerabilities into attack tool kits. Automated scanners and
bots use these tool kits to exploit known and unknown vulnerabilities.
Web servers are typically written in languages such as C to maximize performance.
Python-based frameworks such as Flask typically use library functions, written in C and
integrated into Python, to optimize performance by speeding up critical bottlenecks to performance. Therefore integrating a Python-based machine learning package, one that also
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uses low-level C libraries, into a Python-based web-server is fully viable.
An intelligent agent could either be integrated into the web server software itself or act
as a reverse proxy like the database model. An agent acting as a reverse proxy only checks
incoming Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) requests. An integrated agent would need to
check incoming network packets as well since attacks might target lower level functionality
of the web server.
The attack surface of the web server could be quite large depending on how the agent
is integrated. In both cases, SGD would be a good fit for a machine learning model.
4.4.4 Web browsers
The focus of this paper is on the web application infrastructure. We mention web
browsers only briefly here to provide a more thorough discussion of the web application
ecosystem. A web browser presents a large attack surface on the user’s device. This is due
to the complexity of modern web browsers. They parse HTML and Javascript code, render
audio and visual content, cope with third party extensions, and talk securely to web sites.
Most contemporary web browsers include protections for users. While this paper focuses on
Python frameworks, machine learning frameworks exist for Javascipt, including TensorFlow
[50] and mljs [51].
• Tracking protection prevents a user from being profiled
• Protection against dodgy downloads prevents the user from installing malware
• Blocking pop-up windows protects the user against potentially malicious advertisements
• Disabling third party cookies prevents some user tracking and CSRF attacks
• Private browsing sandboxes the user’s session and prevents user cookies from being
stolen
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Figure 4.4. A DHT for distributing threat intelligence.

Even with the above protections, web browsers still have drawbacks. The above features
mostly guard against known attacks. New attacks can wreak havoc until the browser vendor
updates the software. Web browsers offer no protection against potentially malicious content
in web pages. A good example of this is the CSRF attack detailed in Section 4.2. A web
browser agent would see the unusual content in the image tag and refuse to execute it.
Modern firewalls block all communication by default. Trusted communication, defined by
policy, may pass through. Web browsers allow all communication by default until the user
configures content blocking.

4.5

Distributing the Intelligence
Trained models can be easily distributed using peer-to-peer (P2P) network technology.

Modern P2P networks implement a distributed hash table (DHT). This provides robust,
fault-tolerant, distributed delivery of resources [52] [53]. However, some environments need
strict security controls. In such environments, a private bootstrap host can be used to
connect the private peers to each other.
A DHT for distributing threat intelligence is shown in Figure 4.4. The intelligent agents
discussed in Section 4.4 are depicted in the figure. The DHT can serve several functions. It
can distribute signed trained model data. It can distribute the public keys used to validate
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the signed training data. Potential threats that agents have seen but could not correctly
classify can be distributed and analyzed.
The types of threats that could be handled using the DHT depend on the placement of
the intelligent agents. In the model shown in Figure 4.3, each layer of components runs a
separate DHT. In general, any anomalous behavior can be identified and remediated. The
default response of the components should be to drop the anomalous traffic. Requests that
could not be clearly identified could be quarantined similar to the model seen in email spam
filtering. The anomalous request is moved to a secure sandbox until an administrator can
identify it. Once identified, the request becomes part of the training data and shared with
the agents via the DHT.

4.6

Challenges
From a software engineering and implementation viewpoint, the use of integrated ma-

chine learning at the application level is attractive. Several challenges remain.
Obtaining training data, and especially labeled training data, is problematic. A combination of honeypots, monitoring software, and unsupervised classification could be used to
find classes of data. The data would then require evaluation to see if it is malicious or benign.
Partially trained models could be used to “bootstrap” a system by flagging suspicious, but
uncertain, data for further evaluation.
User adoption is another major challenge. It will be necessary to make the addition of
the models to existing systems as seamless as is possible and to convincingly demonstrate that
the systems provide real benefits to the users. Since, even with advanced machine learning,
the problem of deciding what code actually does without executing it, being isomorphic to
the stopping problem is formally undecidable, it is critical to tune the machine learning to
give a small number of false positives without giving too many false negatives. A system
that “cries wolf” too often will inhibit security as users will learn to ignore it.
Another challenge is the validation and update of training models. Distributed and
custom training on individual machines may seem an ideal model, but it introduces the
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possibility of a “false oracle” attack where the adversary spoofs the machine learning until it
ignores real threats while focusing on noise. Therefore, training probably should be separate
from the online application so that the training can be supervised and performed in a secure
and reliable manner. The models themselves would need to be updated, asynchronously
and securely, to the users. ClamAV [54] is an example of an open-source anti-virus program
which demonstrates that this is an achievable goal.

4.7

Conclusions
This research has examined the factors needed to integrate machine-learning into appli-

cation level security. While technical challenges remain, there is no fundamental architectural
reason why this could not be done. What remains to be demonstrated is that this can be
achieved with a useful level of accuracy while not degrading computational performance.
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PART 5

CONCLUSIONS

This research has shown that detecting DDoS attacks using deep learning models and
techniques is not only feasible, but can achieve high accuracy with reasonable training times.
Importantly, we showed how time affects the accuracy of conventional machine learning
models. The lack of stationarity in the data means that more powerful models are needed
to achieve good classification performance. This relationship between time and whether the
traffic is malicious exists outside of the explicit feature space in the so-called latent space.
We also showed how such an attack detection framework could be applied in realworld settings using intelligent agents and a peer-to-peer network for distributing threat
intelligence. These agents can be embedded in any part of the network including into the
network devices themselves. By sharing the threat intelligence among agents, the need to
retrain individual agents is reduced since the learned representation can be updated as new
threats appear and existing threats evolve.

5.1

Future Research
Though many other deep learning models and techniques exist, we wanted to show that

contemporary models are more than capable of good performance.
We intend to explore the many unanswered questions this research has generated. One
important open question is how the network flow data could be turned into a metric space.
Flow data can be quite verbose. Defining a distance function to convert flows into a spatial
representation could yield performance improvements and open new research possibilities.
Generative models are useful for sampling from the latent space of the data they’re
given. Such models could be used for generating new training data and even predicting
what new attacks could look like.
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More powerful models and techniques could improve performance. Multi-input and
multi-output models can allow for deeper analysis of the flow data. We alluded to this in
Chapter 3 but it’s worth repeating here: it’s possible to use the 1D CNN as a layer in a
larger model. The fast training times mean that a meaningful representation (in the form of
feature maps) can be generated by the CNN and used by the larger model.
Word embedding models could be another approach. Word2Vec is a very popular embedding algorithm and could provide a more meaningful representation of the flow data.
The spectrogram-based approach described in Chapter 3 provided some interesting results. The algorithm used to generate the images can certainly be improved. Certainly other
spectral analysis techniques could be applied.
Another unanswered question is how well the classifiers described in Chapter 3 hold
up against adversarial techniques. This is a crucial issue since the lack of attack signatures
means that the classifiers must be robust and general enough to not mistake deceptive inputs
as benign so as to fool the model.
Finally, how deep learning for DDoS detection might be applied in real-world settings
is yet to be answered. There are many papers in the literature that attempt to answer
this. However, the problem remains that any real-world solution must be able to analyze
the data at extremely high rates. Network hardware at Internet scale is rapidly expanding
in capacity and performance. Contemporary Internet routers make heavy use of interfaces
capable of 100 Gigabits per second throughput. This means that a typical Internet Service
Provider can potentially have usable capacity more than 10 times greater, or in the Terabits
per second range. Further, development of 1,000 Gigabit per second, that is, 1 Terabit per
second, network interfaces is proceeding quickly. These speeds suggest that any attack detection models must be embedded into the hardware they run on. This can be accomplished
using application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) and field programmable gate arrays
(FPGAs).
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PART 6

PUBLICATIONS

This chapter includes publications that I had a role in, but were not related to this
research. For each publication, a brief description is provided.

6.1

Fuzzy Restricted Boltzmann Machines
In [31], we developed a deterministic RBM training algorithm and showed how to use

that algorithm to automatically derive fuzzy membership classes. RBMs are inherently
fuzzy and well suited for situations where only one class is well-formed. We modified several
aspects of the conventional RBM. First, we replaced the typical binary values in the visible
layer with -1 and 1. Doing so simplifies gradient and energy calculations. Next, we replaced
the gradient calculation (typically done using contrastive divergence [55]) with an analytic
approximation. This analytic approximation is able to train much faster since it is not
iterative.
Fuzzy training extends the standard RBM by adding a belief function to each layer.
The layer with the best reconstruction ratio is selected during classification and the most
likely value (if discrete) or expected value (if continuous) for the class assignment is returned
along with an accuracy estimate.

6.2

Analysis of drug resistance in HIV protease
In [56], we combined dimensionality reduction techniques and generative machine learn-

ing (using an RBM) to predict drug resistance profiles from genomic data. Generative machine learning models trained on one inhibitor could classify resistance from other inhibitors
with varying levels of accuracy. Generally, the accuracy was best when the inhibitors were
chemically similar. Restricted Boltzmann Machines are an effective machine learning tool for
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classification of genomic and structural data. They can also be used to compare resistance
profiles of different protease inhibitors.

6.3

Evolution of drug resistance in HIV protease
In [57], we evolved the techniques described in the previous paper (namely, developing

models for predicting the resistance to single inhibitors) to techniques for predicting the
resistance to multiple inhibitors. The previous paper showed that there was significant
cross-prediction accuracy where models trained on one inhibitor predict the response to other
inhibitors. This suggests that there are commonalities in resistance mechanisms and the first
step to studying these commonalities is to build a machine learning model that describes
them. This model can then be used to select sequences for expression, characterization, and
structural analysis. We developed a method of using minimum spanning trees (MST) to
estimate the evolutionary properties of HIV response to drugs.

6.4

Illicit Activity Detection in Large-Scale Dark and Opaque Web Social Networks
In this research [58], we used natural language processing (NLP) techniques to detect

illicit activity on the so-called “dark net”. We examined conversations on the Telegram
network, since many criminal networks exist there. Importantly, we attributed conversations
to users even when their ”handle” changes (as often happens as a way to try to remain semianonymous). We found that we could classify illicit activity, advertisements, and bot activity
with high accuracy when using as little as 10% of the words from the corpus. We further
tested our model by using it to determine whether a message came from Telegram or Twitter
and again obtained high accuracy.
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